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THE DEFAULT INDEX
We turn now to our main topic, fluctuations in the quality of
loans. Let us first recall a few well known facts about the history
of defaults on foreign bonds. During the period of foreign
lending, 1920-30, no bond in our defaulted except two
Brazilian state issues. Even on these two, interest payments were
maintained until 1929 and 1931 and only the sinking
funds were defaulted in 1924 and The 1920's were the
defaultiess era in foreign lending. The
along period and for about 800 individual investments of
this type is remarkable.2
Almost all the defaults of the interwar occurred between
1931 and 1934 under the impact of the depression. As gov-
ernmental revenues dwindled with business1 activity, some govern-
ments found that they could not raise the for foreign debt
service. And even had such funds been available in local currencies
their transfer into dollars would have been Foreign lend-
ing had ceased and American imports, the remaining source
of dollars, shrank in volume and even in value. Seeing their
gold or dollar reserves dwindling many attempted to
protect their currencies by establishing exchange control and de-
faulting on their foreign debts. governments —
Bolivia,Peru, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, and Germany —especially
were inclined to adopt this policy. They "4ldom realize fully the
There was a very small number of defaults on bonds not covered by our
analysis. The only government issue among these one of Chinese govern-
ment notes offered in 1919 and defaulted in 1921; the others were corporate
bonds.
2Absenceof defaults was characteristic of all foreign lending, not just Ameri-
can. "...itis true to say that [at the beginningthe depression] the world
had been free from any substantial measure of default for more than ten years."
Problem of International Investment, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1937, p. 299.
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importance of maintaining the credit standing of their country and
are more apt to take drastic measures with less regard for the
consequences"
Thefirst defaults occurred in Latin America. In January 1931
Bolivia suspended service on its dollar bonds. Peru, Chile, Brazil,
Colombia, and Costa Rica followed suit in rapid succession. In
1932 Uruguay and El Salvador, and in 1933 Panama and Cuba,
failed to meet their external obligations.
In 1932, one year later than in Latin America, a wave of
European defaults set in, which spread rapidly through the agri-
cultural countries of eastern Europe (Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, and Rumania). In Germany the republican govern-
ment met its foreign obligations despite the acute financial crisis.
But when the National Socialist party came into power in 1933 it
immediately reduced and soon after suspended payments on
dollar bonds. The Dawes and Young loans, which at first were
excluded from the moratorium, defaulted one year later. The
great wave of defaults was over in 1934 and during the remaining
interwar years only one major default occurred, that of Poland
in 1936.
Outside Europe and Latin America payments were maintained
on practically all dollar loans. The Canadian province of Alberta
and a few Canadian municipalities were the exceptions.
Thus the period of the twenties when foreign lending flourished
and no foreign loans defaulted was followed in the thirties by a
period of defaults in which the market for new foreign issues prac-
tically disappeared.
In most cases when defaults on government and government
controlled loans occurred, all the loans granted to the country in
question were affected simultaneously. The usual procedure was
for the government of the defaulting country to prohibit the
transfer of debt payments, which meant that all loans owed by
the country were in default. Some governments initially exempted
certain loans from transfer prohibitions but almost all such excep-
tions were brief. Hence the only differences between the individual
loans of the country in question were short intervals between the
'Madden et al., op. cit., p. 120.THE DEFAULT INDEX 31
dates of their defaults. In some countries where partial service was
maintained on defaulted loans, the degree of default differed for
different loans, more foreign exchange allowed for the ser-
vice of certain loans than for others. I
Thefollowing countries were exceptions in that they defaulted
on some of their issues but maintained on others in full:
Canada, Argentina, Panama, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia. All
other countries, in 1937, were in default on all or none of their
bonds.
1 The Sound Loan Curve
In examining the changes in the qualityforeign loans our con-
cern is not with the time of their defaulting but with the time of
their issue. We want to construct a series of the flotations of
defaulted loans and compare it with the of flotations of all
foreign loans described in Chapter 1. Our aim is to determine how
the proportion of defaulted loans to total loans varied during our
period. I
Weshall discuss the definition of 'defaulted loan' used in the
following investigation at length in Section 2. Here we need merely
state that defaulted loans are defined as granted to a bor-
rower who was in partial or total default on December 31, 1937.
To classify each loan in our record as 'sound' or 'defaulted' we
ascertained its fate with the help of the Annual Reports of the
Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council, the Bulletins of the Insti-
tute of International Finance, Kimber's Record of Government
Debts, White, Weld & Co.'s annual publication, Foreign Dollar
Bonds, and investment manuals. The Hndbook, our source for
the volume of offerings, does not cover defaults, as it was published
before their time.
Having determined the status of each we split our original
series of total bond offerings into two parts: flotations of
and of defaulted foreign bonds. The relation between these
two series is the object of our Before expressing it as
a ratio, however, we present the absolute figures of sound loan
flotations. Certain facts can be brought out very clearly by this
series (Chart 4).
First, the sound loan curve shows the same distinct 3 cycles and32 CHAPTER
Chart4
Sound and Total Foreign Government Bonds Issued
in the United States, 1920—1930
Shaded areas represent contractions, white areas, expansions of cyctes according
to NBER chronology. Four quarter moving averages, centered; Appendix Tables 13 and 14.
thesame inverse relation to general business cycles as total foreign
bond flotations. With a few minor and one major exception every
rise and every fall in total loans was accompanied by a simultaneous
rise and fall in sound loans. The major exception is a difference in
timing: the peaks of the sound loan curve lead the peaks of the
total loan curve and this lead lengthens from cycle to cycle until
in the last cycle sound loans reach their peak 3 quarters earlier than
total loans and decline considerably while total
rising sharply. Lending peaks, evidently,
issues are still
were reached in every
case, and especially in the last cycle, in the face of a decline of
sound loans. Second, in contrast to the successively rising waves of
the total loan curve, the last peak of the sound loan curve is the
lowest of the 3. Sound lending was largest in 1924 and in the last
cycle declined not only in proportion to the total, as the ratios will
show, but even absolutely.
2 Definition of the Default Index
The changing distribution of the flotations of eachyear among
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ages. We call the ratio of defaulted loans to all loans issued the
'default index'. When we say the index of 1926 was 60
percent we mean that of the total amountloans floated in 1926
60 percent was granted to borrowers who were in default in 1937.
To avoid misunderstanding it should be noted that we use
'default index' in a sense not ordinarily to it. At first blush,
'default index' might be taken to mean the ratio of loans defaulting
to those outstanding during a period. A default index in this sense
would be zero for 1920-30 when no defaults occurred. In the
1930's it would indicate the impact of the different stages of depres-
sion on outstanding foreign loans. Our default index, on the con-
trary, is designed to measure the impact ofchanging conditions
of the 19 20's on the quality of new issues.
Before presenting the default index wç discuss the criteria by
which we classified a loan as defaulted or not, a) Decisive for the
classification of bonds outstanding on 31, 1937 was
their status on that date. We chose this date for the close of the
interwar period rather than December 1p38 because at the end
of 1938 Europe, alter the occupation of Austria and Sudetenland,
was already under the impact of the forces that came into full
power during the war. We decided against a postwar date because
of the extraordinary situation still prevailing in a number of
countries. However in order to check our findings we examined
the default status at the close of 1949 of bonds issued in 1921 and
1928, and find the results substantially confirmed (see below).
b) We classified a bond as defaulted when bondholders had not
received by December 31, 1937 payments due them according to
the original loan contract in full in dollars. Failure to observe the
gold clause or payment in Canadian rather than in United States
dollars has not been regarded as Bonds also were not
regarded as defaulted if payments were delayed provided the
issuers' obligation was met by December 31, This applies
'In 1937 no gold dollar bonds were being served in gold (in so far as the
Council of Foreign Bondholders was informed). Foreign Bondholders Protec-
five Council, Annual Report, 1938, p. 24.
6Withone exception: one issue was classified as 'sound' though its default was
not completely made up before the end of 1937. In this case the deviation was
so slight that it could be disregarded. The bon4's price at the end of 1937
was 94.34 CHAPTER 2
to a few countries that resumed full service after a short interrup-
tion of transfer on foreign debts and paid the arrears.
c) In computing the default index we did not differentiate among
degrees of default. It seemed preferable to supplement the default
index by a special index of the degree of default (see Sec. 5). The
statement "60% of all bonds issued in 1926 went into default"
carries a definite meaning, which would be blurred if some bonds
were counted, say, as 30 or 60 percent defaulted. Using a rough
measure such as the default index seems justified also from the
business point of view, which tends to regard any loan in default
as a mistake. Besides, payments on defaulted interest coupons
represented only a small percentage of the total amount of matured
coupons on defaulted bonds. According to Madden et al,6 of the
total amount of matured coupons on bonds defaulted after Janu-
ary 1, 1931 and outstanding at the end of 1935, only 11.8 percent
had been paid in cash between January 1931 and December 31,
1935.
d) The most difficult question in rating investments arises from
the fact that some loans were partly or totally repaid before the
end of our period. At first glance this might seem the clearest case
of all. Surely a bond redeemed must be a sound bond and must
be classified as such. For purposes of the default index we have,
however, decided otherwise. The reason is that, as will be demon-
strated below, classification of all repaid loans as sound would bias
the results of our analysis in favor of the hypothesis that the pro-
portion of defaulted loans increased during the period under
review.
Clearly a loan issued in 1920 will on the average have more
chance of being repaid before, say, 1932, than a loan of 1929. Its
term may have expired; sinking fund payments may have served
to redeem a larger proportion of its original value; finally, the
longer a callable bond is outstanding the greater the chance that
for some reason the borrower will decide to repay it before matur-
ity. Consequently the percentage of early loans that was repaid
• and therefore out of danger when the crisis struck was larger than
that of later ones.
Op. Cit., p. 130.THE DEFAULT INDEX 35
The resulting downward bias to the default index for the early
years is illustrated by the following hypothetical case: Two bor-
rowers, A and B, each issue the same amount of bonds in 1920 and
again in 1930. By the depression year 80 percent of the 1920
bonds but only 20 percent of the 1930 bonds has been repaid.




A B A&B A B A&B
Amount issued 100100 200 100100 200
Amount repaid
before 1932 8080 2020
Amount in de-











* Allrepaid loans counted as 'good.
b Loans repaid by borrowers who subsequently ddfaulted counted as 'bad' (see
text).
When repaid parts of loans count as the default index
for loans issued in 1920 is 10 percent, that for loans issued in 1930,
40 percent. The default index for 1930 rises sharply relative to
that for 1920 despite the assumption that the loans granted in
both years were alike except for their date of issue. This increase
is not meaningless. It does show how better the outcome of
the 1920 investments was than that of the 1930 investments. How-
ever, this difference is due solely to lapse of time between
flotation and default.
Actually the role of repayments was not iiearly as great as in
our example and counting repaid loans'good' would only mod-
erately depress the default indexes for the early years.7 Still, we
want to eliminate this factor in order to minimize doubts regard-
ing the validity of our resufts. We have, therefore, devised the
following treatment of loans fully or partly repaid. We distinguish
between two types of such loans. First, Joans that were partly or
fully repaid by borrowers who did not default on any of their debts
See Appendix Table 19.
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in the 1930's are counted as sound. There is no good reason why a
loan whose issuer remained solvent in the 1930's should be con-
sidered as unsound. One might object that early repayments of
parts of its foreign debt may have enabled a country to maintain
payments on the remainder during the crisis, thus preventing de-
faults that would otherwise have occurred. This may be granted;
yet a debt policy that eased a country's position in the depression
and enabled it to avoid bankruptcy is certainly no justification for
classifying that country's issues as unsound. Second, partly or fully
repaid loans by borrowers who defaulted on any issue are counted
as defaulted on the assumption that in this case repayment was
due to the fact that the loan was granted early in the period.
Using this method in the above example we obtain the same
default index for loans issued in 1920 as for those issued in 1930.
This agrees with our assumption that the two pairs of loans were
alike except for their date of issue. This treatment of repaid loans
obviously affords a most rigorous test for the hypothesis that
defaulted loans constituted a rising proportion of all loans issued.
Counting loans of earlier years as unsound when in themselves
they were sound and did not bring the investor a loss, imparts
a declining bias to the trend of the default index. If the index still
shows a rising trend, as it does, we can be confident that this can-
not be due to our method of computation.
The problem of repaid loans cannot, of course, be solved by
excluding them entirely from the investigation and dealing only
with loans outstanding at a given time. A measure of the quality
of the lending of a period must comprise all loans issued during
this period. The meaninglessness of a measure relating only to
loans outstanding at a certain time becomes evident if we assume,
e.g., that 99 of the 100 issues of a period were repaid before the
crisis and that the single remaining issue defaulted. The default
index would be 100 percent, clearly an unacceptable measure of
loan quality.8 If the interval between the time of issue and the date
Applying our method, the 99 repaid issues would be divided into 2 groups:
those repaid by borrowers who did and those repaid by borrowers who did not
default later on. If, say, 9 of the 99 repaid issues belonged in the latter group,
the default index would be 10 percent.THE DEFAULT INDEX 37
when the outstanding loans are examined is sufficiently long, a
default index derived in this way' would always approach 100 per-
cent, since all except the defaulted loans have been repaid.
3 Description of the Default Index
Two default indexes are presented in Chart 5. Default index A
is for foreign loans in the wider sense, iJe., it includes Canadian
issues; default index B is for foreign exclusive of Canadian
loans. The steep upsweep of both curves shows that the quality of
new foreign issues declined sharply during the 1920's. We note
further that, like business in general, the default index rises in 3
Chart5
Default Index: Foreign Government Bonds Issued
in the United States,
19201921192219231924192519261927192819291930
Years bonds were issued
Shaded areas represent contractions, while areas, expansions of business cycles according
















successive waves. But the timing of these waves differs from that
of the 3 business cycles; foreign loan quality moved sometimes
parallel with and at other times counter to cycles in general busi-
ness. This instability may be due to the inverse relation between
fluctuations in foreign loan issues and business cycles. For part of
the period, approximately until the end of 1924 and in 1927, the
proportion of defaulted loans rose and fell with the amount of
lending, so that there was an inverse relation between the default
index and business cycles. But between the first quarter of 1925
and the second quarter of 1926 the default index rose steeply with
the expansion in business activity and despite the decline in new
issues (default index A from 30 to 55 percent; default index B
from 34 to 66 percent). And the improvement of loan quality in
the second half of 1926 took place in the face of an expansion in
loan volume but accompanied a downswing in the business cycle.9
Thus, the direction of the short swings in the default indexes
seems to depend upon the relative strength of two opposing forces:
changes in loan volume and changes in general business condi-
tions. But during the period as a whole these forces were not op-
posed and the default indexes sweep upward in the same fashion
as loan volume and business activity. In other words, the relation
between fluctuations in the default index and short business cycles
was sometimes positive and sometimes inverted, but the relation
to the expansion of the major cycle was positive.
Even at the peak of the first cycle of 'index A' defaulted loans
did not amount to 25 percent of all loans floated. But they were
58 percent of all loans at the peak of the second and as much as
66 percent at the peak of the third cycle. Computing an average
for each of the 3 cycles in cdefault index A' we find that 19 percent
of the bonds floated during the first cycle, 1920-23, went to bor-
rowers who defaulted; whereas the average for the second cycle,
1923-27, was 34 percent, and for the third, 1927-29, 57 percent.1°
In other words, the percentage of unsound loans doubled from the
• How general business conditions influenced the quality of loans is discussed
in Chapter 6.
10Averagesare computed from trough to trough of each cycle. To avoid a
downward bias due to the inclusion of both initial and terminal troughs in
computing the cyclical average, the trough values are weighted one-half each.THE DEFAULT INDEX 39
first to the second cycle and tripled from the first to the third. The
quality of credit declined steeply.
When Canadian loans are excluded, results are even more
striking. Since few Canadian loans defaul;ed, index B is consider-
ably higher than A. The higher level does not, of course, imply
anything about the slope of the series which, however, was even
steeper than that of index A (Chart 5). Index B increasesfram
34 percent at its first peak to 67 at the second and to 90 at the
third. The 3 cycle averages are 24, 40,
astabilizing eleme4t as far as loan quality
was concerned."
The default index by geographic groups of borrowing countries is analyzed
in Chapter 3.
Chart6
Default Index Based on Number of Issues
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To increase confidence in our results we test them further by
computing a default index in terms of the number of bond issues
instead of their dollar value. Because of the big variations in the
amounts of individual issues ($10,000 to $125,000,000), the num-
ber of issues is a poor measure of lending. We use it solely to test
the stability of our results. As we are interested mainly in the broad
movements of the indexes, we simplify the procedure by using
annual data on the number of issues instead of moving averages
of quarterly data (Chart 6). These curves too tend strongly up-
ward, supporting the previous results. Default indexes A and B
both roughly double whether we compare the first and the last
peak or the averages for the first and last cycle. The slopes are less
steep than those of the default index for the dollar amount of loans,
indicating that the deterioration of credit involved a change in
the relative size of sound and unsound loans as well as in their
number. While the average sound issue was 3 percent larger than
the average unsound issue in the first half of the period, it was 2 '/2
percent smaller in the second half. When the numerous small
sound Canadian loans are omitted, the average value of sound
issues becomes much higher. Yet there is the same change in rela-
tive values. Sound loans, in this case, averaged 85 percent larger
than unsound in the first half and 59 percent larger in the second
half of the period (App. Table 16).
Thus all our tests confirm the hypothesis that the quality of
foreign loans declined sharply during the 1920's.
Below it is shown that this is further confirmed when the default
index is based on the status of the bonds in 1949 instead of in
1937.
4 Degree of Default
To supplement the default index we analyze the variations in the
degree of default of foreign bonds. In the default index all de-
faulted bonds were treated alike; partial payments of interest
coupons were disregarded. The upward slope of the default index
indicates that a larger proportion of late than of early loans de-
faulted. But to interpret this as a deterioration in the quality of
loans we must assume that the degree of default remained constantTHE DEFAULT INDEX 41
over the period. Conceivably loans issued in early years might
have defaulted completely and those of later years kept up a par-
tial service. In this way the rise in the default index might be offset
by a decline in the degree of default. there such an offsetting
improvement in defaulted loans? If loans floated in the
later years were no better than those in the earlier years,
our interpretation of the default index is justified.
Differences among defaulted bonds are reflected to some extent
in their prices. The average price on 31, 1937 of the
defaulted bonds issued, say, in 1925, may serve as an index of the
degree of their default. A series of such! indexes by the date of
issue of the bonds measures the in the degree of default.
Accordingly, we computed the arithmetic mean of the prices of
defaulted bonds issued at a given time, weighted by the par values
of the issues.'2 Not all bonds counted in the default
index are contained in the price index. Repaid loans, obviously,
had to be omitted. A few minor issues in foreign currencies also
had to be excluded because a price in could not be ascer-
tained. The price index comprises 81 percent of the number and
91 percent of the dollar value of the bonds in the default index.
Chart 7 shows that there was no change in the degree of default
that would offset the change in the default index.13 Average prices
at the close of 1937 of bonds issued in 1927 and 1928 were about
the same as those of bonds issued in 192 1922, namely 20-25
percent of their par value.
The price of a bond does not by any means, of course, reflect
merely the degree of its default. It depends also upon expectations
of the market and on policies pursuedthe debtors. To evaluate
the price index correctly, we must theiefore 'note some of the
special factors affecting bond prices in 1937. Prices of German
bonds, which constitute a large part of the unsound bonds issued
in the late twenties, were much higher in 1937 than the payments
4 quarter moving averages of weighted pricesdivided by 4 quarter moving
averages of weights.
"Thiscurve cannot be interpreted like an price index. It does not
reflect changes in a group of prices over time. It shows prices quoted on one
date for bonds floated at different times.42 CHAPTER 2
Chart7
Average Price on December 31, 1937
of Defaulted Foreign Government Bonds Issued
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Four quarter moving overQqes, centered; Appenthx TaUe 14.
theirholders received could have explained. After prolonged delay
the German authorities finally, in March 1937, issued 3 percent
funding bonds in lieu of interest payments due on nonReich Ger-
man bonds since June 1934. But even these funding bonds were
available only for coupons matured before the end of 1936; no
provision whatever was made for coupons maturing later. Yet
these bonds were quoted at about 20 because confidence in Ger-
many was still relatively high and because Germany herself was
in the market to buy her own defaulted bonds, thus raising their
prices. Quotations for Latin American defaulted bonds were rela-
tively much lower. For instance, Brazilian bonds, which constitute
a large part of the unsound bonds issued in the early twenties,
brought about the same prices as the German though they paid
in 1937 from 321/2 to 50 percent of interest due. This relative over-
valuation of part of the defaulted loans of later years imparts an
upward bias to the price index. If the index still does not show a
rising tendency, we can be satisfied that defaulted loans of the
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late twenties were no better than defaulted loans of the early
twenties.
We do not attribute much significance to the price index of
defaulted bonds except as a check on the default index. Such an
index inevitably includes few observations at times when —as
in 1920, 1921, and 1923 —fewunsound loans were issued. The
index is therefore highly unreliable for these years and we refrain
from drawing any further conclusions from it.
5 Note on the Present Status of' Foreign Bonds
What has happened to foreign bonds since 1937? Were they greatly
affected by the World War? Did the world shaking events of the
last decade make the bad debtors solvent and the good ones
bankrupt? The answer is no. The great majority of countries that
serviced their loans in full in 1937 did so in 1949; most of the
countries in default in 1937 were in default in 1949.
What is the explanation of this consistency? Were the econo-
mies of countries in default worse off during these 12 years than
those of solvent countries? For many countries this cannot be the
explanation. Half of the defaulted were issued by Latin
American countries that were highly prosperous during the war
with booming dollar exports. Many good issues, on the other hand,
were from countries that were invaded and occupied and suffered
grievously. Belgium, France, and Norway, for example, kept pay-
ing all they owed; others, such as Peru Bolivia, paid and pay
almost nothing. Though most South American countries did im-
prove service on their loans not one ofthose in default in 1937
decided to pay its creditors their due.14
In view of these facts no revolutionary changes in the default
index are to be expected when the the bonds on Decem-
ber 31, 1949 instead of December 31, 193'7 is used to classify them.
To give some idea of the magnitude and direction of these changes
we recomputed the default index for 2 years, each fairly represen-
Argentine bonds, except a few provincial issues, were not in default in 1937.
A few Central American and Caribbean countries in partial default in 1937
have completely repaired their defaults, e.g., tuba, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala.44 CHAPTER 2
tative for its period, 1921 and 1928. The increase in the propor-
tion of defaulted issues again stands out clearly. Canadian loans
are included. Default is defined as before: any deviation from
contractual payments. Defaulted loans are loans to borrowers in
default at the close of 1949.
The new default index for issues of 1921 is 44 percent, that for
issues of 1928 74 percent. The corresponding figures based on the
default status of 1937 are 34 percent for 1921 and 68 percent for
1928.The difference between the two pairs of indexes is due
almost entirely to Danish issues, which were not in default in 1937.
In 1949 Denmark was paying interest fully as stipulated, but had
not yet resumed full service on sinking funds or repaid an issue
due in 1942. The latter, however, was quoted at 94 at the close of
1949. Except for Danish issues the two indexes based on 1949
would differ only fractionally from the corresponding ones based
on 1937. The few changes that did occur during these 12 eventful
years roughly offset one another.
During the long period since foreign bonds first defaulted debt-
ors have made various arrangements with their creditors, arrange-
ments that fulfill contractual obligations more or less completely.
In other words partial default now plays a greater role than in
1937. In several countries old bonds have been exchanged for
new ones with lower interest rates, and it is sometimes a matter
of opinion whether the original issue is still to be counted among
defaulted issues. To indicate how decisions about the doubtful
cases affect the default index, we make the experiment of shifting
defaulted issues quoted at 75 or higher at the close of 1949 to
sound issues. The results are not altered materially. The new index
for 1921 is 31 percent, that for 1928, 63 percent; both standings
are remarkably similar to those based on the default status in 1937.
Measured against the events in these 12 years the change in
the default status of debtor countries was certainly slight. The
resulting stability of the default index enhances its significance as
a measure of loan quality. The unchanging character of nations as
debtors has further interesting implications for the interpretation
of defaults and loan deterioration (see Ch. 6).THE DEFAULT INDEX 45
6 In
The statistical investigation has a fact what was
before surmised by some,15 denied by others, and ignored by the
majority of economists: that the quality of foreign bond issues
changed materially during the nineteen The 'lending of
the twenties', as far as time of lendingconcerned, has usually
been treated as one homogeneous mass to all parts of which much
the same explanation is appropriate. This simplification may for
certain purposes be justified. For others it distorts the picture. In
any case general statements about the lending of the twenties are
founded upon an average representing very different conditions.
We have applied statistical methods to a subject that seemed
unpromising. The foreign lending of the twenties is commonly
described as 'erratic' and 'chaotic' and indeed it was subject to
strong forces of diverse and varying power. To make the rule of
order in this field seem rather unlikely, it suffices to cite events
such as the occupation of the Ruhr, the Locarno Pacts, the col-
lapse of European currencies, the reestablishment of the gold
standard. Moreover, we are dealing errors in individual in-
vestment judgment which, even apart from the special field of
foreign lending, seem too elusive and subjective to possess much
order or regularity. It is noteworthy, that despite the.
small scope of our investigation, empirical analysis has enabled
us to uncover a rational picture and a high degree of order where
chaos was supposed to rule.
7 Note on Two Investigations of Investment Quality
Two other investigations of investment quality by date of invest-
ing substantiate the results of the foreign bond analysis.
One is a study of domestic bonds made by George W. Edwards
See particularly an a'rticle by Max Winkler in the New York Tribune of
March 17, 1927: "Any one who has followed closely the various foreign offer-
ings in this country within recent months could not help noticing the steady
decline in the quality of such new loans." Quoted in Max Winkler, Foreign
Bonds, an Autopsy (Roland Swain, 1933), p. 85.
Cf. also W. A. Brown, op. cit., p. 585, who in discussing American foreign
lending remarks on "the appearance of poorer credit risks among
the borrowers. .. ."46 -• CHAPTER2
Table 6
Default Status of Domestic Bonds Outstanding in December 1931,
by Date of Issue
Total No.
of Bonds % of Bonds
Date of Issue Issued Defaulting









No information 551 22.0
Total 4,398 20.2
George W. Edwards, Control of the Security-Investment System, Harvard
Business Review, Oct. 1933, p. 7.
in 1932. Edwards grouped all 4,398 issues in Fitch's Bond Record
in December 1931 by their date of issue and computed the "per
cent of the total number issued for each year which were in actual
or pending default" in December 1931 (Table 6). "From this
table it is seen that of the bonds issued in 1927, 1928, and 1929,
31.1 percent went into actual or pending default, as compared
with a much lower percentage for the bonds issued in previous
years."1° Edwards attributes the decline in quality to "conditions
of overcompetition and irresponsibility" in which "the purchasing
function of investment banking was poorly performed" and "Capi-
tal was frequently raised for corporations and for governments
whose financial position did not warrant such financial assis-
tance".17
Investment of a very different character is the subject of R. J.
Saulnier's recent interesting analysis, Urban Mortgage Lending by
1-farvard Business Review, Oct. 1933, pp. 6, 7. Edwards' figures refer only to
bonds still outstanding in December 1931. If bonds repaid before that date were
included the percentage of bonds issued in earlier years and defaulting would
be even lower, and the rise of this percentage over the period steeper.
George W. Edwards, The Evolution of Finance Capitalism (Longmans,
Green, 1938), p. 231.THE DEFAULT INDEX 47
Life Insurance Companies.18 "The increase in loan delin-
quency, which began in the early soon transformed large
segments of the urban mortgage holdings of life insurance com-
panies into owned real estate. But not all types of loans were
foreclosed with the same relative frequency, and it is pertinent to
inquire which groups of loans had the best, and which the worst,
records in this respect. To give quantitative expression to these
differences in loan experience, the sample'of urban mortgage loans
was classified according to relevant of the loan
contracts and of the properties securing them and ratios of the
number and original amount of foreclosed loans to the total num-
ber and amount of loans, referred to as foreclosure rates, were
calculated for several classifications."
Among the many characteristics analyzed for their effect on
foreclosure rates is the time of loan Saulnier too found
that experience with loans of the twenties differs according to the
time of lending. The foreclosure rate for loans made in 1920-24
and not extinguished by the end of 1934 was 24 percent; the cor-
responding rate for loans made in 1925-29 was 41 percent.19
Since these mortgage loans had on average much shorter
terms than the foreign bonds, foreclosurt rates are more affected
by the exclusion of extinguished loans than our default index.
"While the average contract life for all l?ans made between 1920
and 1934, and extinguished by 1946, 6.7 years, the defaulted
loans had an actual life of 13.9 years between origination and
final sale of property, while other loans an average actual life
of 8.3 years."2° Consequently, most of the sound loans made in
1920-24 had been extinguished by 1935, 10 to 15 years after they
were made, while a much larger proportion of defaulted loans
had not yet been disposed of. This mustr be taken into account if
the foreclosure rate for this period, 24 percent, is to be evaluated
correctly. A large part of the sound loans made during the next
5 years, on the contrary, did not expire until after 1934. This, of
course, tends to pull down the foreclosure rate for loans made in
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, 'p.82.
Based on ibid., Tables 22 and BlO.
Ibid., pp.47-8.48 CHAPTER 2
Table 7
Foreclosure Rates on a Sample of Urban Mortgage Loans Made by
Life Insurance Companies
PERIOD PERIOD EXTINGUISHED TOTALOR
MADE 1920-241925-291930-341935-391940-46AVERAGE
NUMBER OF LOANS MADE AND EXTINGUISHED
1920-24 104 503 140 103 83 933
1925-29 254 593 631 606 2)084
1930-34 116 335 316 767
ORIGINALAMOUNT OF LOANS MADE AND EXTINGUISHED (millionsof dollars)
1920-24 .85 4.86 .73 1.16 1.08 8.67
1925-29 2.75 4.68 5.75 10.42 23.61
1930-34 .90 2.12 3.18 6.20
FORECLOSURE RATE
Percentage of Number
1920-24 0 0 4.3 24.3 30.1 6.0
1925-29 4* 6.7* 32.8* 38,4* 23,1*
1930-34 4.3 21.8 21.2 18.9
Percentageof Amount
1920-24 0 0 3.2 31.5 31.5 8.4
1925-29 3* 57* 40.1* 54.1* 34.8*
1930-34 4.7 25.2 18.3 18.7
*Foreclosurerates on loans made in 1925-29 higher than on those made in the
preceding or following quinquennium.
R. J.Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies
(NBER, 1950), Table BlO, family dwellings and all other property combined.
1925-29.Underthese circumstances 41 percent must be consid-
ered a very high rate.
Moreover, the contrast between the good and the really bad
yearsis smoothed when comparisons are made by 5-year intervals.
For instance, the foreclosure rate for the earlier period is pushed
up considerably by the inclusion of 1924, which had a much
higher foreclosure rate than the preceding years, whereas the rate
for the later period is held down by the rate for 1925, which was
much lower than the following ones.
Table 7 compares the issues of 1925-29 not only with the pre-
ceding but also with the following period. Among the loans extin-
guished in any given period those made in 1925-29 always had
considerably higher foreclosure rates, whether number or amount
is the criterion, than those made before or after this time.
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investigation reflect "the optimism of both parties
to the mortgage contract at precisely the time when increased
caution was warranted"2' and point to in credit quality
in mortgage lending similar to though perhaps less far-reaching
than that in foreign lending. Interest were lower in 1925-29
than in 1920-24; the relative numbers of the two safest types of
loans, those under $5,000 and those amortized, were smaller
in the later quinquennium. The average size of loans on family
dwellings rose 23 percent from 1920-24 to 1925-29; loans on
income-producing properties, which had higher foreclosure rates,
increased nearly 50 percent in average amount. Moreover, larger
loans reflected not only the rise in real estate prices but also an
increase in the average ratio of the amount loaned to the value
of the property.22
All this is interesting for the foreign bond analysis because mort-
gage loans and domestic bonds are utterly unaffected by anything
peculiar to foreign lending, such as transfer troubles or the inex-
perience of creditors. The three types of have only this
in common: they originated in the samt market and responded
similarly to its changing climate. Analysis of investment experi-
ence in other fields, e.g., business failures by the time of the estab-
lishment of the firm, might reveal a similar change in quality.
100.
Ibid., Tables 10 and B3